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Ladies  and  Gentlemen, 
INTRODUCTION 
It is with  great  pleasure  that  I  accepted to speak  to you  during  my 
visit  in  Ireland. 
The  antitrust  rules  of  the  European  Community  are an  increasingly  important 
body  of  law  of  which  companies  doing  business  in  Europe  must  be  fully 
informed.  It therefore  seems  quite appropriate to me  that you  should 
devote  some  attention to a  discussion of the  various  issues  and 
developments  in this field. 
I  shall  hereafter start to explain  the  European  Commission's  view  on  the 
purpose  and  function  of  the  European  competition policy before  subsequently 
dealing  with  some  of  the most  recent  developments  in  the  framework  of this 
policy. 
I.  THE  PURPOSE  AND  FUNCTIONS  OF  EUROPEAN  COMPETITION  POLICY 
It is clear from  a  reading  of  the Treaty of  Rome  (Treaty establishing 
the  European  Economic  Community>,  that the  European  Community  is 
essentially  ba~ed on  a  market  economy  in which  fair and  undistorted 
competition  has  a  fundamental  role to play.  This  is already apparent 
from  one  of  the first articles of  that  Treaty  stating that  the 
European  Community  shall  include  the institution of  a  system  ensuring 
that  competition  in  the  Common  Market  is not  distorted.  In  this 
context  it is necessary to  remind  you  from  the start that  the 
competition  rules of the  European  Treaties  have  a  constitutional 
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character.  The  Community  authorities  can  pass  legislation  influencing 
the  Treaty  rules,  but  they  cannot  change  them. 
It is  in this framework  that  the  European  Commission  pursues  its 
competition policy. 
Thus  the  Commission  reaffirmed  in  1983  tne principles of  this policy, 
namely  that  in a  market  economy  system  such  as  that  of  the  Community 
it is essential to  preserve  the  stimulus  of  fair and  effective 
competition  in order that  the  economy  can  reap  the  benefits of  tree 
trade.  The  decisions  the  Commission  took  hence  reflected a  continuing 
determination to  rigorously  enforce  the  competition  rules,  but  also 
a  desire to encourage  industrial  restructuring,  to  improve  the 
competitiveness  ofEuropean  industry,  to promote  research  and 
development  and  innovation,  and  to accelerate  the  ~rogress towards  a 
single  Community  market. 
As  this shows,  the  Commission's  work  of  auministering  competition 
policy  cannot  be  encapsulated  by  the  sole  objecti\~ of  removing 
distortions  causes  by  anti-competitive  practice~ or  State aids  which 
are  Liable  to  interfere with  inter-State trade.  Competition  policy 
also  contributes  to  improving  the  allocation of  resources  and  raising 
the  competitiveness  of  Community  industry,  and  thanks  to  t.his 
greater  competitiveness,  secured  largely by  encouragement  of  research 
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and  development,  to enabling  the  Community  at  Length  to overcome 
the economic  problems  now  facing  it and  in particular to  combat 
structural unemployment.  In  this  way  competition policy can  play 
its·part, with  other  Community  policies,  in  securing  a  Lasting 
economic  recovery. 
In  other words,  the  European  Commission  firmly  believes that 
competition  is  the best  stimulant of  economic  activity since it 
guarantees  the  widest  possible freedom  of  action to all.  An  active 
antitrust policy pursued  in accordance  with  the provision of  the 
Treaty makes  it easier for  the  supply  and  demand  structures 
continually to adjust  to technological  development. 
Through  the  interplay of  decentralized decision-making  ~achinery, 
competition enables  and  obliges enterprises  continuously to  improve 
their efficiency,  which  is the sine qua  non  for  a  steady  improvement 
in  living standards  and  employment  prospects  within  the  countries  of 
the  European  Community.  From  this point  of  view,  competition  policy 
is  an  essential means  for  satisfying to a  great extent  the  individual 
and  collective needs  of  our society. 
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Having  pictured the  broader  objectives of  our  competition  policy, 
I  will  now  give  you  a  general overview  of  the  recent developments 
in the  Community's  competition  rules  which  took  place  in 1983  as 
well  as  a  brief sketch  about  the  Legislative programme  of  the 
European  Commission  in  the antitrust part  of  this field. 
II.  RECENT  DEVELOPMENTS  IN  THE  ANTITRUST  RULES 
An  important  element  of  the  work  of administering  the competition 
rules  relating both  to business  practices and  State aids  consists 
in trying to create a  more  certain  Legal  environment  for  economic 
behaviour  by  issuing  frameworks  showing  the patterns of  behaviour 
that are and  are  not  acceptable. 
The  rules  relating to business  practices  were  expanded  in  1983  by 
two  block  exemption  regulations,  covering  exclusive distribution and 
exclusive  purchasing  agreements.  The  same  desire  to  increase  L,gal 
certainty prompted  the  Commission  to continue  its work  on  finalizing 
similar  regulations  for  patent  Licensing,  motor  vehicle distribution 
and  research  and  development  cooperation. 
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In  relation to State aids, too,  the Commission  in 1983  pursued  i.ts 
policy of  making  greater efforts to  clarify the circumstances  in 
which  it can  regard  an  aid  scheme  that  has  been  notified to it as 
compatible with  the  common  market. 
The  Member  State governments  thus  had  referred to them  for  comment 
a  draft  framework  for  aid to  research  and  development  projects and 
will  shortly be  asked  to  comment  on  a  similar draft  framework  for 
aid  to energy  and  energy-saving  projects.  The  Commission  commenced 
preparatory work  on  a  revised  version of  the principles of  coordination 
of  regional  aid,  an  extension of  the-Fifth  Directive ·on  aid to ship-
building and  a  special  new  procedure,  involving notification,  for 
monitoring  certain types  of  cumulation of  aid for different  purposes. 
The  Commission  also embarked  upon  a  detailed  study  of  problems  of 
·control  involved  where  the authorities  in  charge  of  administering  an 
aid  scheme  are  widely  dispersed geographically or at different  levels 
of  the administration or  where  the aid  itself can  assume  complex 
forms  or  is opaque.  This  study thus  goes  into the growing  problem  of 
controlling government  involvement  which  can  distort  competition 
because  of  possible aid elements,  the acquisition of  public  share-
holdings  in firms,  was  also the subject of  a  detialed analysis  by  the 
Commission  with  a  view  to defining  the  circumstances  in which  such 
operations  should fall to be  scrutinized under  Articles  92  and  93  ofi 
the  EEC  Treaty. 
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III.  THE  LEGISLATIVE  PROGRAMME 
Coming  now  to our  legislative programme  aimed  at  reinforcing and 
expanding  the existing  legislative framework  in  the antitrust field 
of  European  Community  law.  This  programme  includes bOth  the further 
pursuit of existing  Commission  proposals  for  legislative action  by 
the  Council  of  Ministers  as  well  as  new  legislation to be  adopted  by 
the  Commission  itself. 
In  the first  category  I  should  mention  the continuing efforts of  the 
Commission  to have  its implementing  regulations  for air and  sea 
transport  adopted,  as  well  as  the fact that  the  Commission  has 
incorporated most  of the proposed  amendments  of  the  European  Parliament 
into its pr.oposed  regulation on  merger  control and  the announcement 
that a  new  attempt  would  be  made  in  the  Council  of  Ministers to secure 
its final  adoption. 
Indeed,  the fact  remains  that  the  Commission's  powers  of  intervention 
and  control are  inadequate  to deal  effectively with  all concentration 
situations  in the  EEC  capable  of  harming  competition.  The  Commission 
is therefore trying to get its powers  extended.  A draft  regulation 
for  merger  control  has  been  under  discussion  by  the  Community's  main 
law-making  body,  the  Council  of  Ministers,  for  several years.  It is 
based  on  Article 235  of  the  EEC  Treaty.  This  is a  "cover-all" 
provision  which  allows  the  Community  law-making  bodies  to fill in 
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for  gaps  in the Treaty if this is necessary  for  the  Common  Market 
to operate properly or to achieve one  of  its goals.  The  European 
Parliament  has  recently adopted  a  resolution calling upon  the  Council 
of  Ministers to adopt  the  proposed  regulation.  It  is  in this  context 
that the  Commission  took  its  renewe  initiative. 
first 
In  this kategory one  should  also mention  the fact  that  the  Commission 
is at  present  studyi~g the possibility of  further  Legislative action 
to strengthen the enforcement  of  the antitrust  rules of  the  EEC  Treaty 
through  private damage  actions  brought  before  national  courts.  Even 
though  in  the enforcement  of  Community  competition  Law  actions  before 
the  national  courts  have  not  gained  the  importance  of  treble damage 
actions  under  US  antitrust  Law,  I  would  Like  to emphasize  that  the 
enforcement  of  Community  competition'rules  through  national  courts 
is of great  importance  to the  proper  functioning  of  the  system. 
In  the second  category one  should  mention  the several  block  exemptions 
which  the  Commission  proposed  to adopt  in 1984.  In  this  category  are 
included,  not  only the draft  regulation on  R &  D which  I  will  comment 
more  in detail,  but  also the block  exemptions on  patent  licences,  on 
selective distribution  in the  automobile  sector and  an  enlargement  of 
the existing block  exemption  on  specialization agreements. 
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With  such  block  exemptions  the  Commission  attempts  to codify its 
existing practice of  individual decisions granting exemptions  of 
the antitrust prohibition under  Article 85/3  of  the  Treaty  into 
regulations,  thereby giving  the companies  who  comply  with  these 
regulations absolute  legal  protection. 
It is therefore to be  expected  that the power  to grant  such  ,: 
exemptions  will  become  one  of the  majo~ instruments  by  which  the 
European  Commission  steers its competition  policy  in  coordination 
with  the other policies of  the  European  Communities.  Competition. 
policy thus  becomes  part of  the overall economic  policy the 
Commission  is pursuing.  This  is not  surprising  since the  European 
Court  already  indicated  in one  of its  judgments  in 1969  that a  link 
exists between  the economic  objectives of  Article  2 of  the  Treaty 
and  the competition rules,  and  in particular with  Article 85/3. 
This  explains  why  the  European  Commission  does  not  limit  itself to 
merely  applying  the  artitrust  rules of  the Treaty  as  a  prosecution 
authority would  do,  but  conducts  a  real  policy  in this field. 
This  having  been  said,  let's now  turn more 
specifically to the block  exemption  on  Research  &  Development 
cooperations.  I  would  first  like to situate it in the broader  context 
and  explain why  we  considered that there was  a  need  for it at this 
time. 
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IV.  THE  NEW  BLOCK  EXEMPTION  ON  R & D COOPERATIONS 
The  Research  & Development  of  today  forms  the  basis of  the products 
of  tomorrow.  The  world  is  in  the midst  of  a  third  industrial  revolution. 
New  technologies  are growing  up  and  old technologies are declining. 
Our  industry  has  realised that  is future depends  on  the development 
of  these  new  technologies.  However  the  complexity  of  such  technologies 
requires  Large  and  steadily  increasing  resources  of  capital  and 
expertise  resulting  in  high  technical  and  financial  risks for  under- . 
takings  embarking  on  the development  of  such  technologies.  European 
industry because  of  its fragmented  nature  is at something  of  a 
disadvantage  here.  There  has  therefore  been  a  growing  interest  in 
cooperative  Research  & Development  between  undertakings  and  between 
countries.  The  Commission  looks  favourably  on  such  cooperation where 
this stimulates progress  and  reduces  costs while  allowing  competition 
to continue. 
The  block  exemption  would  apply  to ,:Research  and  Development 
cooperation agreements  in all sectors of  the economy  although  it is 
to  be  expected  that it will  be  of  most  benefit  in those sectors 
where  Research  and  Development  costs are  highest  and  the scope  for 
economies  of  scale  in  Research  and  Development  is  the greatest.  One 
can  cite here  as  examples  pharmaceuticals  and  the  emerging  so-called 
high-technology sectors. 
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Since undertakings  do  not  carry out  Research  and  Development 
purely for  the  advancement  of  science but  alw~ys with  a  view  to 
producing  a  marketable  new  or  improved  product  there is often a 
close  Link  between  Research  and  Development  and  production.  For 
this  reason  the block  exemption  allows  cooperation to be  extended 
into production of  products arising out  of  the  Research  and 
Development  in  cases  where  the  benefits of  such  cooperation  can  be 
presumed  to outweigh  the disadvantages. 
Apart  from  defining  the permitted  scope  of  the  cooperation,  the 
block  exemption  will also make  clear that it applies to  Research  and 
Development  and  production  agreements  whatever  form  they  take. 
Indeed  the  cooperation might  merely  provide for  the allocation of 
Research  and  Development  tasks  and  the  exchange  of  results or may 
provide for  the setting up  of!Joint  Research  and  Development  teams 
or  joint  ventures.  The  exemption  will also apply  where  the whole 
or part of the  Research  and  Development  programme  is sub-contracted 
out  to other undertakings or to specialized Research  and  Development 
orgnisations or universities.  Where  the exempted  agreement  will 
also be  permitted to  cover  production,  the  cooperation  may  take  the 
form  of  specialisation or  joint production  within the framework 
of  a  joint  venture.  Joint  sub-contracting of  the  whole  or part  of 
the production would  also be  covered  by  the  exemption. 
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It is interesting to note that  the  US  government  is also 
thinking  along  the  same  lines  in wishing  to encourage  <or  rather 
not  discourage)  cooperation  in  Research  and  Development. 
A number  of  bills have  been  presented to  Congress  for  this  ~urpose. 
The  one  which  seems  most  likely to succeed  in becoming  law  is the 
"National  Productivity and  Innovation  Act  of  1983"  which  has  the 
backing  of  the  US  administration. 
A comparison  of  the approaches  being  followed  on  either side of  the 
Atlantic does  however  show  a  certain number  of  ddfferences  and  in 
particular that  the  Commission  is prepared to go  further  in  exempting 
such  cooperation  from  the  antitrust  rules  than  are the  US 
authorities. 
It is my  intention to proceed  with  preparation of  this  Regulation 
as  quickly  as  possible and  to present  it for  adoption  by  the 
Commission  in the  course  of  this year.  The  Commission  hopes  that 
when  adopted  its proposed  Regulation  will  remove  the obstacles 
- often more  psychological  than  real  - which  Article 85  is  sometimes 
considered  to  pose  for  transnational  cooperation agreements  in the 
field of  Research  and  Development.  This  would  then  constitute  new 
and  important  step  in  implementing the present  legislative programme 
of  the  Commission  in the antitrust field. 
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The  tast point which  does  not  really belong  in our  legislative 
programme  but  which  might  be  of  interest to you,  conoerns  the 
relations between  ~he various antitrust authorities in the world 
and  in particular with  those  in the United  States. 
As  became  clear already in a  very  early stage of  our  policy,  some 
contact  with  those authorities  is  necessary  in order to avoid 
conflicts.  Taking  as  an  example  the present  approach  on  research  and 
development  cooperation it is for  instance clear that the  same 
cooperation,  if carried out  by  companies  on  both  sides of  the Atlantic, 
could  be  subject to both  legislations. 
Although  the  European  Communities  are not  bound  by  a  formal  convention 
with  the United  States,  as  is the  case  for  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany  and  more  recently for  Canada  and  Australia,  it must  be 
'  emphasized  that  we  have  formal  links with  them  through  the  OECD-
framework  and  procedure  in Paris.  If at any  given  time  this  channel 
would  prove  to be  insufficient, it could  of  course  be  enlarged 
by  bilateral conventions  to be  negociated  by  the  Commission  on  behalf 
of  the  Council  of  Ministers. 
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V.  PROCEDURAL  QUESTIONS 
My  last set of  comments  concerns  the actual  organization of  our 
antitrust work  in the  Commission.  There  are a  lot of misconceptions 
about  this  among  distant observers  of  the  work  of  the Brussels 
administration.  I  will  however  only deal  with  one  of  the aspects 
of  our  procedure  tooay. 
The  Commission  is aware  of  the  concern  which  interested economic 
and  legal  circles have  expressed  with  regard  to the  length  of  the 
procedure  leading  to a  formal  decision  in the  competition area. 
There  are a  number  of  reasons  why  it is not  possible for  the  Commission 
to  take formal  decisions  within the  period  of  time  desired  by  these 
circles  :  administrative constraints,  partly due  to the procedural 
safeguards  which  have  been  established to protect  the  r~ghts of  the 
defence,  or the  rights of  complainants,  have  made  the procedure  more 
cumbersome,  and  t~chnical _problems  relating to translations  in  the 
seven  language  versions or to staff shortages  are also  responsible 
for  slowing  down  matters. 
The  Commission  nevertheless  understands  the desire for  more  rapid 
action  and  has  sought  ways  in which  procedures  can  be  accelerat~d 
without  diminishing  the  legal  position of  those  concerned. 
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One  of  the ways  in which  acceleration can  in general  be  effected 
is through  a  reduction of  the number  of  cases  to be  dealt with 
on  an  individual  basis,  so  that the  remaining  cases  can  be  dealt 
with  more  efficiently and  rapidly.  In this context,  the  Commission 
has  pursued  its efforts to adopt  block  exemption  r•gulations with 
resp~u:t to certain categories of  agreements.  Also,  the  propOSed  incl~,~SiCI'l of 
opposition procedures  in such  block  exemption  regulations  is an 
important  instrument  aimed  at achieving  acceleration. 
Indeed,  the debate  concerning  acceleration and  simplification of 
procedures  has  often touched  on  the desirability of  having  a 
so-called  "opposition procedure",  that is, a  procedure  whereby 
agreements  which  have  been  notified to the  Commission  are auto-
matically deemed  to be  admissible  if the  Commission  has  not  raised 
any  objections  in their  regard  within a  specific prescribed period. 
lt must  be  underlined  in this  context  that the  Commission  has 
neither the  intention nor  the power  to turn  Article 85's principle 
of  prohibition of  restrictive agreements  io~o a  principle of  the 
control  of  abuses. 
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Nonetheless,  the  Commission  has  proposed  the  introduction of  an 
opposition procedure  as  a  means  of  simplifying  the application of 
Article 85  C3>  in special  cases.  Such  an  approach  can  already  be 
found  in  the  Council  Regulation  applying  the  rules of  competition 
to transport  by  rail,  road  and  inland  waterway  as  well  as  in  the 
proposed  Regulations  applying  those  rules to the air and  sea 
transport  sectors.  Accelerated  procedures  have  likewise been  intro-
duced  in  the proposed  block  exemption  regulations  regarding  patent 
licensing agreements  and  research  and  development  agreements,  and 
an  amendment  of  the block  exemption  regulation on  specialization 
agreements  also  includes  such  a  procedure. 
For  cases  which  do  not  fall  within  the  scope  of  block  exemption 
regulations,  accelerated  individual  treatment  can  be  achieved  where 
appropriate  by  a  more  widespread  use  of  administrative  letters~ 
Finally,  more  frequest  recourse  to national  courts for  the application 
of  Article 85  (1)  and  86  would  serve to ease the  Commission's  burden, 
thereby allowing  more  rapid treatment  of  the  cases  it must  deal  with • 
. I. - 16-
CONC4!ION 
After 20  years of application it appears,  therefore,  that the 
European  Community  competition  rules, which  have  had  to be 
implemented  in  very  different economi·c  circumstances  - from 
sustaiined expansion  to marked  recesUon  - have  stood  the t•sttof 
t·.ime .. , Based  on  the 91eneral  principle o.f  prohibition accompanied 
by  possible exemptions,  the  system  ofsupervision is suffdciently 
flexible  to take account of  the economic  conditions prevailing at 
any  given  time. 
Where  the  European  Commission  notes  that  the existing  rules are 
wanting,  it puts  forward  additional measures  as  required,  as  in 
the case of  the  ECSC  Treaty,  which  needed  to be  supplemented  to 
make  temporary  provisions for  specific  rules  for aids  to the  steel 
industry.  This  should also apply  to the supervision of  significant 
me:rgers. 
While  economic  horizons  remain  hazy,  pursuit of  a  workable  competition 
po.Licy  is more  neces·sary  than ever.  The  in-depth  sectoral analyses 
carried out  under  the Commission's  programme  of  studies  have  revealed 
favourable  development  prospects  in the various  industries where 
competi.tion  operates effectively.  These  encouraging  signs  inspire 
determination to press on  with  measures  consistently directed towards 
ac.hievement  of  a  competitive economy. 